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RETROACTIVE DIPLOMATIC IMMUNITY 
ANNA RAPHAEL† 
ABSTRACT 
  When German tennis star Boris Becker attempted to become a diplomat 
of the Central African Republic in 2018 to avoid bankruptcy proceedings 
in the United Kingdom, much of the world ridiculed his efforts. But his 
actions begged a genuine question: Can an individual become a diplomat 
so that his or her past actions are immunized from prosecution or suit, even 
after the actions have occurred or court proceedings have been instituted? 
In the United States, the answer appears to be yes. On at least two 
occasions, federal courts have allowed such retroactive applications of 
diplomatic immunity in cases involving allegations ranging from false 
imprisonment to mistreatment of domestic workers. Presumably under the 
political question doctrine, these courts reasoned that they must defer to 
the executive branch on issues of foreign affairs and on State Department 
certifications of diplomatic immunity, in particular. These courts did not 
review the factual contexts of the cases, which would have illuminated that 
the individuals in question were not actually diplomats, would be unlikely 
to ever act as diplomats, and seemingly had obtained diplomatic status 
solely for the purpose of evading suit or prosecution.  
  This Note argues that the purposes of diplomatic immunity, analogies 
to other forms of immunity like presidential immunity, and the potential for 
unfettered abuse all cut against the retroactive application of diplomatic 
immunity. Courts need not dismiss cases as nonjusticiable under the 
political question doctrine solely because a case involves a question of 
diplomatic status. Rather, courts should narrowly tailor the judicially 
developed political question doctrine when legitimate issues as to the 




Copyright © 2020 Anna Raphael. 
 † Duke University School of Law, J.D. expected 2020; University of Florida, B.A. 2016. Thank 
you to the student editors of the Duke Law Journal and participants of the Scholarly Writing Workshop 
for helpful comments. 
RAPHAEL IN PRINTER FINAL_REVISED.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 3/20/2020  11:19 AM 
1426  DUKE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 69:1425 
INTRODUCTION 
In the United States, foreign diplomats enjoy full immunity from both 
civil and criminal liability, meaning they cannot be arrested or detained, their 
real and personal property cannot be searched, and they are not subject to the 
jurisdiction of domestic courts.1 In light of this immunity, one might think 
that diplomats exploit their positions and threaten the safety of American 
citizens. Indeed, complaints of diplomats taking advantage of their status 
permeate the media.2 But such abuse is not particularly widespread, and 
diplomats rarely commit violent crimes.3 Regardless of whether criticism of 
diplomatic immunity is generally valid, there is an even more brazen 
potential for abuse that must be addressed. The current U.S. legal regime 
permits a seldom-discussed retroactive application of diplomatic immunity, 
meaning that an individual can commit a crime, obtain diplomatic status, and 
then have that immunity “shield” the individual from liability for those 
wrongful actions taken before the individual obtained such status.4 
Consider the following troubling hypothetical application of retroactive 
diplomatic immunity: Monsieur Rich is a wealthy foreign national living in 
the United States. Monsieur Rich launders money, which is a federal crime 
under the Money Laundering Control Act of 1986.5 After Monsieur Rich 
finds out that he is being investigated for money laundering, he proceeds to 
call his old buddy Madame Shady, who works at the foreign ministry in a 
country that ranks highly on the list of most corrupt countries in the world. 
Monsieur Rich explains the situation to Madame Shady and asks if there are 
any diplomatic openings available to him. Madame Shady replies: “Of 
course, we always need attachés.” Madame Shady proceeds to communicate 
Monsieur Rich’s new diplomatic status to the U.S. State Department, which 
in turn certifies Monsieur Rich’s status. When the U.S. Department of Justice 
indicts Monsieur Rich for money laundering, Monsieur Rich moves to 
dismiss on the ground that he is immune from prosecution. Because courts 
 
 1. See infra Part I.B (providing an overview of diplomatic privileges and immunities).  
 2. See infra note 70 (discussing newsworthy cases).  
 3. See infra Part I.C (noting that abuse of immunity is usually confined to traffic violations).  
 4. See infra Part II (explaining the legality of retroactive diplomatic immunity). Although the 
concept of retroactive diplomatic immunity has seldom been discussed in legal scholarship, it has been 
mentioned in the mainstream press. See Alison Frankel, Retroactive Immunity for the Consul?, CHI. TRIB. 
(Dec. 19, 2013), https://www.chicagotribune.com/news/ct-xpm-2013-12-19-sns-rt-us-column-frankel-
20131218-story.html [https://perma.cc/HRR4-75S8] (“It’s a rare but not unprecedented State Department 
device to grant foreign officials full immunity for their actions even if they weren’t entitled to such broad 
protection when they committed the supposed misconduct.”). 
 5. Money Laundering Control Act of 1986, 18 U.S.C. § 1956 (2018).  
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generally defer to the State Department on the issue of an individual’s 
diplomatic status,6 Monsieur Rich gets off scot-free.  
Although this hypothetical may appear farfetched, it is actually on the 
tamer side of the few documented cases. Federal courts have twice 
approached the issue of retroactive diplomatic immunity in cases that 
involved allegations of false imprisonment, visa fraud, and mistreatment of 
domestic workers.7 In both cases, the federal courts declined to question the 
State Department’s certification of diplomatic status, despite the fact that the 
individuals were not diplomats at the time of their alleged wrongdoing or 
even, in one case, when the suit commenced.8  
The problem with nondiplomats9 abusing diplomatic immunity is not 
constrained to evading serious crimes committed in the United States. Unlike 
actual diplomats, nondiplomats seemingly would not have a foreign 
government to answer to. Although foreign diplomats are not subject to U.S. 
jurisdiction, they typically remain subject to the jurisdiction of their sending 
state.10 But for wealthy and connected nondiplomats, diplomatic immunity 
may be seen as a means of escaping prosecution or suit in any jurisdiction, 
presumably without the fear of facing repercussions in the very sending state 
that corruptly provided their status in the first place.11 It is unlikely that a 
foreign government willing to issue an individual a diplomatic position after 
violating U.S. law would then prosecute that individual for the same 
wrongdoing. And because federal courts have long refused to review 
certifications of an individual’s diplomatic status under the political question 
doctrine, once such a status is obtained, these nondiplomats may abuse it 
without any sending state’s bona fide supervision, meaning that any 
wrongdoing may go undetected. This not only goes against the very purpose 
of diplomatic immunity,12 but also is unique in the sense that no other form 
of immunity, including presidential immunity, may be granted 
 
 6. See infra Part II.B. 
 7. See generally Abdulaziz v. Metro. Dade Cty., 741 F.2d 1328 (11th Cir. 1984); United States v. 
Khobragade, 15 F. Supp. 3d 383 (S.D.N.Y. 2014). These cases are discussed further infra Part II.B. 
 8. Id.  
 9. For the purpose of this Note, “nondiplomats” are defined as individuals who seek diplomatic 
status after committing a wrongdoing, for the purpose of evading suit or prosecution, and without actually 
performing or intending to perform any diplomatic functions.  
 10. See infra note 68 and accompanying text.  
 11. See infra Part II.C (discussing a high-profile example). It should be noted that, likely because 
of the surreptitious nature of retroactive diplomatic immunity, public examples are sparse. But this does 
not necessarily indicate the actual number of cases. The fact that retroactive diplomatic immunity is so 
rarely discussed—especially in legal scholarship, where no author has deeply examined the subject—
necessitates this Note.  
 12. See infra Part II.A.  
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retroactively.13 Federal courts therefore should not allow retroactive 
diplomatic immunity to persist solely in the name of deference to the 
executive branch under the political question doctrine.  
This Note proceeds in three parts. Part I details the history and 
development of modern U.S. diplomatic immunity, from its early origins to 
the codification of the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations in 1961 
and the current doctrine. It explains the privileges and immunities accorded 
to foreign diplomats in the United States, the process of obtaining diplomatic 
immunity, and the limits on immunity that were developed to curb abuse. 
Part II argues that the purpose of the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic 
Relations, analogies to other forms of immunity, and the potential for abuse 
cut against the concept of retroactive diplomatic immunity. However, 
because courts have repeatedly refused to review State Department 
certifications of immunity under the auspices of the political question 
doctrine, retroactive diplomatic immunity lives on. Part III considers several 
possible solutions to this problem, concluding that the judiciary should 
narrowly construe the political question doctrine when an individual’s 
diplomatic status is a genuine issue of fact and law.  
I.  THE HISTORY AND DEVELOPMENT OF U.S. DIPLOMATIC IMMUNITY 
For centuries, diplomatic privileges and immunities persisted solely 
under customary international law.14 It was not until 1961, with the Vienna 
Convention on Diplomatic Relations, that the first comprehensive treaty on 
diplomatic law came into being.15 Part I traces the history leading up to the 
Vienna Convention, its international ratification, and its eventual 
codification in the United States. It explains the scope of privileges and 
immunities accorded to diplomats under the Vienna Convention, along with 
the principal rationales behind these immunities. It then discusses how 
individuals obtain diplomatic immunity and the extent to which laws have 
been enacted to curb its potential for abuse.  
 
 13. See infra Part II.D (explaining that presidential immunity, qualified immunity, and defense 
witness immunity may not be applied retroactively).  
 14. Customary international law is one of two principal forms of public international law. CURTIS 
A. BRADLEY & JACK L. GOLDSMITH, FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW xxv (6th ed. 2017). Unlike a written 
treaty, customary international law arises from the “general practices and beliefs of nations,” meaning 
that it does not exist unless “nations have consistently followed a particular practice out of a sense of 
legal obligation.” Id. For an overview of how customary international law works in federal courts, see 
generally Ryan M. Scoville, Finding Customary International Law, 101 IOWA L. REV. 1893 (2016).  
 15. See infra notes 41–45 and accompanying text (discussing the Vienna Convention).  
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A. Background 
Diplomatic immunity has existed in some form or another stretching 
back to antiquity.16 During the Roman Empire, for example, “a messenger 
from a foreign territory was generally allowed to complete his mission 
without the fear of interference.”17 And long before diplomatic law was ever 
codified, countries observed the personal inviolability of diplomats.18 The 
establishment and expansion of permanent embassies further solidified the 
existence of diplomatic immunity,19 which at the time persisted primarily 
under customary international practice.20  
Various theories have been proposed to justify the existence of 
diplomatic immunities and privileges, but three have drawn the most 
widespread acceptance: the theories of personal representation, 
extraterritoriality, and functional necessity.21 The theory of personal 
representation finds its greatest support in ancient history and relays the 
concept that “the diplomatic agent is the personification of his ruler or of a 
sovereign state whose independence must be respected.”22 The foreign envoy 
was seen as “sacrosanct,”23 holding a character of religious importance, 
much like the royal prince.24 But the theory of personal representation has 
 
 16. J. CRAIG BARKER, THE ABUSE OF DIPLOMATIC PRIVILEGES AND IMMUNITIES: A NECESSARY 
EVIL? 14 (1996) (“The roots of diplomatic law lie buried in ancient history . . . .”). 
 17. Id. at 33.  
 18. See id. at 32, 71 (“[T]he inviolability of the person of the diplomatic agent was probably the 
first principle of diplomatic law and remains the most fundamental today.”). As early as 700 B.C., Roman 
ambassadors were said to have been accorded personal inviolability. MONTELL OGDON, JURIDICAL 
BASES OF DIPLOMATIC IMMUNITY: A STUDY IN THE ORIGIN, GROWTH AND PURPOSE OF THE LAW 16–17 
(1936). 
 19. See BARKER, supra note 16, at 34–35 (“It was not until the establishment of permanent 
diplomatic relations . . . that the need for comprehensive enumeration of diplomatic privileges and 
immunities arose.”); EILEEN DENZA, DIPLOMATIC LAW: COMMENTARY ON THE VIENNA CONVENTION 
ON DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS 7 (4th ed. 2016) (noting that states did not typically need to establish 
diplomatic relations until the creation of permanent missions).  
 20. U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, DIPLOMATIC AND CONSULAR IMMUNITY: GUIDANCE FOR LAW 
ENFORCEMENT AND JUDICIAL AUTHORITIES 1 (1998) [hereinafter DIPLOMATIC IMMUNITY GUIDANCE].  
 21. See CLIFTON E. WILSON, DIPLOMATIC PRIVILEGES AND IMMUNITIES 1 (1967) (noting that 
scholars have “consistently turned to one of [these] three traditional theories”). Some scholars use the 
terms “extraterritoriality” and “exterritoriality” interchangeably. See Extraterritoriality, ENCYCLOPEDIA 
BRITANNICA, https://www.britannica.com/topic/extraterritoriality [https://perma.cc/8SKH-M9XH] 
(noting the two words as synonyms).  
 22. WILSON, supra note 21, at 1.  
 23. DENZA, supra note 19, at 213.  
 24. See OGDON, supra note 18, at 8 (“[A]mbassadors were sacred and inviolable . . . because they 
represented a foreign prince.”). Some argue that this “cloak of religious sanctity” was likely just a means 
of “guarantee[ing] against harm being done to persons who were regarded as fulfilling an essential role 
in society.” BARKER, supra note 16, at 34.  
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lost much of its luster following the American and French Revolutions, with 
the fall of divine monarchies and the rise of modern democracies.25 The 
theory also draws criticism for its failure to address why diplomats should 
be accorded immunities for their unofficial acts, wherein they are not 
generally thought of as representing the sovereign.26  
Under the theory of extraterritoriality, foreign diplomats are considered 
mere passersby unencumbered by local laws.27 The diplomatic property is 
thought of as belonging to the foreign jurisdiction rather than to the local 
jurisdiction.28 This legal fiction follows the idea “that the ambassador must 
be treated as if he still is living in the territory of the sending state”29 and is 
therefore not subject to the jurisdiction of the receiving state.  
The theory of functional necessity—likely the strongest of the three—
stands for the proposition that diplomats must be free to move safely between 
jurisdictions and be immune from local jurisdictions so as to conduct 
diplomacy effectively and facilitate international discourse.30 Without the 
ability to travel freely and independently, a diplomat would not be able to 
perform his or her duties properly.31 Diplomacy would be unworkable if 
diplomats were unable to communicate with their sending country securely 
or if receiving states were able to “open diplomatic bags and read their 
contents, listen to their telephone calls, hack into diplomats’ e-mails,” and 
so forth.32 Judge Richard J. Cardamone of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 
Second Circuit aptly summarized the safety diplomatic immunity provides 
to American diplomats abroad under the current framework:  
 
 25. See WILSON, supra note 21, at 4 (“The concept [of personal representation] was somewhat more 
difficult to accept, even theoretically, after sovereign authority was transferred to the people, especially 
in presidential systems where rule-making is shared by the executive, legislative, and judicial branches.”). 
François Laurent, an early nineteenth-century critic of diplomatic immunity found this basis to represent 
“the fetishism of royalty and the arrogance of the prince” and the “voice of a time past.” LINDA S. FREY 
& MARSHA L. FREY, THE HISTORY OF DIPLOMATIC IMMUNITY 339 (1999) (quotations and citations 
omitted). 
 26. See WILSON, supra note 21, at 4 (“Since the theory of personal representation fails to extend a 
foundation for immunity to private acts, it must be rejected . . . .”).  
 27. See id. at 5 (describing two ways in which the theory explains diplomatic immunity). 
 28. Id. 
 29. Id. at 6–7. 
 30. Id. at 17; see also Veronica L. Maginnis, Note, Limiting Diplomatic Immunity: Lessons Learned 
from the 1946 Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of the United Nations, 28 BROOK. J. INT’L L. 
989, 995 (2005) (describing functional necessity as “the most accepted theory for the justification of 
diplomatic immunity”).  
 31. See BARKER, supra note 16, at 224 (“It would seem that the requirement that the individual 
diplomat is left free to perform his functions independently and efficiently has always been part of the 
justification behind the granting of diplomatic privileges and immunities.”).  
 32. Brian Barder, A Former Diplomat’s Reflections on the Vienna Convention, in DIPLOMATIC LAW 
IN A NEW MILLENNIUM 16 (Paul Behrens ed., 2017).  
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The risk in creating an exception to mission inviolability in this country is 
of course that American missions abroad would be exposed to incursions 
that are legal under a foreign state’s law. Foreign law might be vastly 
different from our own, and might provide few, if any, substantive or 
procedural protections for American diplomatic personnel . . . . Recent 
history is unfortunately replete with examples demonstrating how fragile is 
the security for American diplomats and personnel in foreign countries; 
their safety is a matter of real and continuing concern.33  
Supporters of the functional-necessity theory find it especially relevant in 
times of war, when “[i]n the midst of hostilities it is necessary to send 
ambassadors to make overtures of peace or to propose measures tending to 
moderate the horrors of war.”34 Critics argue that this theory is anachronistic 
in a world with modern technology that enables governments to conduct 
foreign diplomacy from just about anywhere, enabling wholesale avoidance 
of hostilities.35  
Despite the long tradition of diplomatic immunity under customary 
international law, it was not until the early eighteenth century that the British 
Parliament formally acknowledged it by making the arrest of foreign 
diplomats unlawful.36 The U.S. Congress passed a similar law in 1790, 
providing for absolute criminal and civil immunity for foreign diplomats, 
their family members and servants, and diplomatic-mission staff.37 The 1790 
Act made it a crime for an American to arrest or even attempt to sue any 
foreign diplomat or “foreign national[] connected in any capacity with a 
diplomatic mission located in the United States.”38 That legal landscape 
lasted for almost two centuries but drew significant criticism for its lack of 
 
 33. 767 Third Ave. Assocs. v. Permanent Mission of the Republic of Zaire to the U.N., 988 F.2d 
295, 300–01 (2d Cir. 1993). Altering the immunities granted to foreign diplomats in the United States 
would likely threaten the safety of U.S. diplomats working abroad because countries largely rely on 
reciprocal grants of diplomatic immunity. See Bradley Larschan, The Abisinito Affair: A Restrictive 
Theory of Diplomatic Immunity?, 26 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 283, 286 (1988) (“Obviously, host States 
count on reciprocal immunity for their diplomats abroad.”).  
 34. OGDON, supra note 18, at 10; see also GRANT V. MCCLANAHAN, DIPLOMATIC IMMUNITY: 
PRINCIPLES, PRACTICES, PROBLEMS 184 (1989) (“Immunity has enabled diplomats to work abroad with 
the peace of mind required for success in performing difficult tasks in a sometimes hostile environment.”).  
 35. See, e.g., William G. Morris, Note, Constitutional Solutions to the Problem of Diplomatic Crime 
and Immunity, 36 HOFSTRA L. REV. 601, 635 (2007) (“Given increased technological innovations, the 
ability of leaders to interact has grown enormously and has decreased the necessity of posting diplomats 
abroad.”).  
 36. See DIPLOMATIC IMMUNITY GUIDANCE, supra note 20, at 2 (“In 1708 the British Parliament 
formally recognized diplomatic immunity and banned the arrest of foreign envoys.”).  
 37. Id. 
 38. R. Scott Garley, Note, Compensation for “Victims” of Diplomatic Immunity in the United 
States: A Claims Fund Proposal, 4 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 135, 139 (1980).  
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safeguards and capacity for abuse.39 Starting in the twentieth century, the 
international community began pushing for a more restrictive form of 
diplomatic immunity that would protect the functions of a diplomat but not 
the diplomat in his or her individual capacity,40 leading to the Vienna 
Convention on Diplomatic Relations in 1961.  
A general formulation of diplomatic law, the Vienna Convention on 
Diplomatic Relations “was largely a reaction to the unlimited immunity 
historically granted to diplomats” under customary international law.41 On 
April 18, 1961, thirty-four nations signed onto the Vienna Convention,42 
laying out what would later become the framework for diplomatic privileges 
and immunities in almost every country.43 No prior attempt at universalizing 
diplomatic relations had come close to the widespread adoption of the 
Vienna Convention.44  
Although the United States signed the Vienna Convention in 1961, it 
did not come into force in the United States until December 13, 1972.45 
Furthermore, Congress did not codify the Vienna Convention by passing the 
Diplomatic Relations Act of 1978 for another six years.46 In addition to 
codifying the Vienna Convention, the Diplomatic Relations Act repealed the 
1790 Act, required diplomats to carry liability insurance, and created a 
substantive right of action for injured parties to file suit directly against the 
 
 39. See id. at 139–40 (explaining that many nations found absolute diplomatic immunity overly 
broad because it effectively stripped citizens of any legal remedy for harms caused by diplomats and 
others).  
 40. Id. at 141.  
 41. Mitchell S. Ross, Rethinking Diplomatic Immunity: A Review of Remedial Approaches To 
Address the Abuses of Diplomatic Privileges and Immunities, 4 AM. U. INT’L L. REV. 173, 180 (1989).  
 42. Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations, Apr. 18, 1961, 23 U.S.T. 3227, 500 U.N.T.S. 95 
[hereinafter Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations]; see Privileges and Immunities, Diplomatic 
and Consular Relations, Etc., U.N. TREATY COLLECTION [hereinafter U.N. TREATY COLLECTION], 
https://treaties.un.org/pages/viewdetails.aspx?src=treaty&mtdsg_no=iii-3&chapter=3&lang=en 
[https://perma.cc/A37E-N79K] (listing parties to the Vienna Convention).  
 43. See U.N. TREATY COLLECTION, supra note 42 (noting 192 parties to the Convention).  
 44. See DENZA, supra note 19, at 2–3 (“None of the earlier attempts at multilateral codification—
the Vienna Regulation of 1815[,] . . . the Resolutions adopted by the Institute of International Law in 
1895 and 1929, the Harvard Draft Convention on Diplomatic Privileges and Immunities of 1932—had 
covered the field so thoroughly.”).  
 45. S. COMM. ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, 96TH CONG., LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE DIPLOMATIC 
RELATIONS ACT iii (Comm. Print 1979) [hereinafter LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE DIPLOMATIC 
RELATIONS ACT]. 
 46. Id. For purposes of this Note, the controlling law on diplomatic immunity in the United States 
will be referred to as the Vienna Convention rather than the Diplomatic Relations Act, as the Diplomatic 
Relations Act simply states that persons entitled to diplomatic immunity in the United States “enjoy the 
privileges and immunities specified in the Vienna Convention.” 22 U.S.C. § 254(b) (2018).  
RAPHAEL IN PRINTER FINAL_REVISED.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 3/20/2020  11:19 AM 
2020] RETROACTIVE DIPLOMATIC IMMUNITY 1433 
insurer when the foreign diplomat enjoys civil immunity.47 These additions 
addressed what Congress viewed as the principal abuse of diplomatic 
immunity: diplomats’ lack of accountability for traffic-accident injuries.48  
B. Privileges and Immunities Accorded to Foreign Diplomats in the 
United States 
Under the Vienna Convention, unlike the 1790 Act, not every foreign 
national connected to a diplomatic mission is entitled to complete immunity. 
The Vienna Convention delineates three categories of foreign nationals: 
diplomatic agents, administrative and technical staff, and service staff.49 
Diplomatic agents and their family members are entitled to “the highest 
degree of privileges and immunities,”50 including personal inviolability, 
immunity from criminal jurisdiction, immunity from civil jurisdiction, and 
immunity from being compelled to testify in court.51 Administrative and 
technical staff of diplomatic missions and their family members are entitled 
to immunities and privileges identical to those of diplomatic agents in all 
respects except for civil immunity.52 Administrative and technical staff enjoy 
functional immunity from civil suits, meaning that only acts connected with 
official mission duties are immune from liability.53 Service-staff members 
possess official-acts immunity, but carry no personal inviolability, 
inviolability of property, or immunity from being compelled to testify in 
court.54 Unlike diplomatic agents and administrative and technical staff, the 
family members of service staff maintain absolutely no privileges or 
immunities.55   
 
 47. LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS ACT, supra note 45, at 31.  
 48. See, e.g., id. at 29 (noting that “[p]erhaps the most dramatic of . . . incidents” the Diplomatic 
Relations Act was meant to address “have involved automobile accidents in which American citizens not 
at fault have suffered enormous damage and injury but have been unable to collect any compensation” 
(statement of Sen. Paul Sarbanes)).  
 49. DIPLOMATIC IMMUNITY GUIDANCE, supra note 20, at 4–5.  
 50. Id. Diplomatic immunity extends only to certain family members, including the diplomat’s 
spouse. Privileges and Immunities, U.S. DEP’T STATE, https://www.state.gov/ofm/
accreditation/privilegesandimmunities/index.htm [https://perma.cc/H2MF-YH7J]. Diplomatic immunity 
also extends to the diplomat’s unmarried children who are under the age of twenty-one, under the age of 
twenty-three and attending a college or university full time, or who have physical or mental disabilities. 
Id.  
 51. Diplomatic and Consular Immunity, U.S. DIPLOMACY, http://www.usdiplomacy.org/
diplomacytoday/law/immunity.php [https://perma.cc/VW6L-8ZLK]. 
 52. DIPLOMATIC IMMUNITY GUIDANCE, supra note 20, at 5.  
 53. Id. at 5. Because the family members of administrative and technical staff have no official 
mission duties, they are not entitled to any immunity from civil suit. Id. 
 54. Id.  
 55. Id.  
RAPHAEL IN PRINTER FINAL_REVISED.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 3/20/2020  11:19 AM 
1434  DUKE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 69:1425 
Personal inviolability is the “cornerstone” of diplomatic law.56 Under 
this privilege, diplomats may not be arrested, detained, or handcuffed.57 
Diplomats similarly may not be compulsorily searched by law enforcement 
officers.58 Neither the real nor personal property of the diplomatic mission 
may be searched or seized.59 Relatedly, foreign diplomats are also immune 
from both civil and criminal jurisdiction in the United States, meaning that 
any action brought against such an individual must be dismissed.60 Although 
the Vienna Convention lays out no particular procedure for raising the 
defense of diplomatic immunity in civil cases,61 courts have in practice 
granted a defendant diplomat’s motion to dismiss when supported with a 
State Department certification attesting to the diplomat’s status.62 But the 
majority of cases involving individuals entitled to diplomatic immunity 
never see the courtroom, as many potential plaintiffs abandon suit once they 
learn of the diplomat’s immunity.63 However, in cases where diplomats 
initiate suit, they waive their civil immunity in regard to any resulting 
counterclaims.64  
Immunity from criminal jurisdiction enjoins the prosecution of 
diplomats for any crime, however serious the offense may be.65 This 
immunity largely works in tandem with the inviolability of a diplomat’s 
person and property. Inviolability makes it especially challenging for 
authorities not only to prove criminal misconduct, but also to detect it at the 
outset.66 On the rare occasions officials do institute criminal actions against 
diplomats, as with civil actions, courts dismiss the indictment.67 That said, 
 
 56. BARKER, supra note 16, at 71.  
 57. See DIPLOMATIC IMMUNITY GUIDANCE, supra note 20, at 4 (explaining that diplomatic agents 
may not be handcuffed “except in extraordinary circumstances”).  
 58. DENZA, supra note 19, at 222.  
 59. See DIPLOMATIC IMMUNITY GUIDANCE, supra note 20, at 4 (stating that diplomatic agents 
“enjoy complete personal inviolability, which means that . . . neither their property (including vehicles) 
nor residences may be entered or searched”). 
 60. E.g., Sabbithi v. Saleh, 605 F. Supp. 2d 122, 126 (D.D.C. 2009).  
 61. DENZA, supra note 19, at 255.  
 62. See, e.g., Carrera v. Carrera, 174 F.2d 496, 496–97 (D.C. Cir. 1949) (granting the defendant’s 
motion to dismiss after the State Department recognized defendant as an employee of the 
Czechoslovakian Embassy); Fun v. Pulgar, 993 F. Supp. 2d 470, 473–74 (D.N.J. 2014) (dismissing the 
plaintiff’s suit following State Department certification of defendant’s position as Counselor to the 
Permanent Mission of Peru to the United Nations).  
 63. DENZA, supra note 19, at 255.  
 64. DIPLOMATIC IMMUNITY GUIDANCE, supra note 20, at 4–5.  
 65. Id. at 4.  
 66. MCCLANAHAN, supra note 34, at 128.  
 67. See, e.g., United States v. Khobragade, 15 F. Supp. 3d 383, 388 (S.D.N.Y. 2014) (dismissing an 
indictment alleging, inter alia, visa fraud); see also Martina E. Vandenberg & Sarah Bessell, Diplomatic 
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the opportunity to prosecute the alleged crime is not wholly lost, as criminal 
immunity in the receiving state does not impede the possibility of 
prosecution by the sending state.68 However, such prosecution is unlikely.69  
C. Limiting Abuses of Diplomatic Immunity 
Much of the concern about diplomatic immunity stems from its 
presumed susceptibility to abuse. News headlines detailing diplomats getting 
away with major crimes have likely factored significantly into this 
opposition.70 Despite the extensive media coverage of the few egregious 
cases, such cases are not especially common,71 and diplomats rarely commit 
violent crimes.72 Recently, abuses have been restricted mostly to minor 
infractions, such as parking offenses.73 One reason for this may be that the 
 
Immunity and the Abuse of Domestic Workers: Criminal and Civil Remedies in the United States, 26 
DUKE J. COMP. & INT’L L. 595, 598 (2016) (noting the rarity of criminal prosecution of diplomats in the 
arena of domestic abuse, for example). On occasion, the government has also dropped charges against 
diplomats of its own volition. See Richard Gonzales, Feds Drop Prosecution of 7 Turkish Bodyguards 
Involved in Assault of Protesters, NPR (Mar. 22, 2018, 6:51 PM), https://www.npr.org/sections/thetwo-
way/2018/03/22/596227771/feds-drop-prosecution-of-7-turkish-bodyguards-involved-in-d-c-brawl 
[https://perma.cc/HW7X-AAQ8] (dropping charges against Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan’s 
bodyguards for an assault allegedly committed against American protesters).  
 68. Ross, supra note 41, at 190.  
 69. See Steven Erlanger, Officials Defend Concept of Diplomatic Immunity, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 7, 
1997), https://www.nytimes.com/1997/01/07/nyregion/officials-defend-concept-of-diplomatic-
immunity.html [https://perma.cc/7NLC-RGYD] (“Almost invariably, . . . diplomats . . . [involved in 
criminal] cases are called home by their governments, or expelled by the host government, and do not 
face criminal charges.”). But see MCCLANAHAN, supra note 34, at 136 (“[T]he diplomat’s knowledge of 
possible prosecution by his own government can be an effective deterrent.”).  
 70. See BARKER, supra note 16, at 6–10 (describing the Da Silveira and Abisinito affairs as catalysts 
for attempted reforms to diplomatic immunity).  
 71. See Erlanger, supra note 69 (“Serious cases themselves involving diplomats are relatively rare, 
State Department officials said, with about 10 to 15 cases a year that are nearly all questions of shoplifting 
or drunken driving, and usually involve the dependents of diplomats.”); see also LEGISLATIVE HISTORY 
OF THE DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS ACT, supra note 45, at 31 (“Most of the diplomats who are our friends 
and neighbors are scrupulous in avoiding abuse of this [diplomatic] privilege, but sadly a minority is not.” 
(statement of Sen. Charles Mathias)).  
 72. See David Usborne, Can a Diplomat Get Away with Murder?, INDEPENDENT (Jan. 10, 1997, 
1:02 AM), https://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/can-a-diplomat-get-away-with-murder-
1282444.html [https://perma.cc/WHY4-YEB8] (calculating that in 1995, out of the eighteen thousand 
individuals entitled to diplomatic immunity, “less than one tenth of one per cent were involved in serious 
crime”). As a comparison, in 1995, the United States had a total violent-crime rate almost seven times 
higher than that of diplomats alone. See Crime in the United States, FBI: UCR, https://ucr.fbi.gov/crime-
in-the-u.s/2014/crime-in-the-u.s.-2014/tables/table-1 [https://perma.cc/BGW8-YWYT] (showing a 
general population violent-crime rate of approximately 0.68 percent).  
 73. See Elizabeth Bumiller, Diplomats Make No Apologies for Immunity, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 13, 
1997), https://www.nytimes.com/1997/04/13/nyregion/diplomats-make-no-apologies-for-
immunity.html [https://perma.cc/W9XG-VB5M] (discussing the problem of diplomatic parking 
violations). Examples of diplomatic parking offenses include “blocking fire hydrants” and leaving 
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Vienna Convention—supplemented by state practice—implemented two 
limiting mechanisms to curb abuse, namely waiver of diplomatic immunity 
and designation of a diplomat as persona non grata. 
When the federal government wishes to prosecute a foreign diplomat 
but cannot due to the diplomat’s immunity, the prosecution can request that 
the foreign government waive the diplomat’s immunity.74 The U.S. State 
Department’s official position is that it will request a waiver whenever “the 
prosecutor advises that he or she would prosecute but for immunity.”75 The 
practice of waiver derives from one of the primary ambitions of the Vienna 
Convention: protecting diplomacy and the diplomat’s functions, rather than 
the diplomat as an individual.76 The United States has had mixed results in 
securing waivers.77 Elements factoring into these variable outcomes include 
the state of relations with the sending country,78 the severity of the alleged 
crime,79 the amount of evidence supporting the allegation,80 and the potential 
public outcry in the sending state were a waiver to be granted.81  
Likely the most famous case of waiver involved Georgian diplomat 
Gueorgui Makharadze, who struck and killed an American teenager while 
driving under the influence in Washington, D.C.82 Anger over the sixteen-
year-old’s death spread through Capitol Hill, and New Hampshire Senator 
Judd Gregg called upon President Bill Clinton to suspend the $30 million in 
 
millions of dollars’ worth of parking tickets unpaid. Ray Sanchez, Diplomats Owe $17 Mln in New York 
Parking Fines, REUTERS (Sept. 24, 2011, 5:16 PM), https://www.reuters.com/article/uk-un-fines-
newyork/diplomats-owe-17-mln-in-new-york-parking-fines-idUSLNE78N00D20110924 
[https://perma.cc/F283-L3XQ]. 
 74. Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations, supra note 42, art. 32.  
 75. DIPLOMATIC IMMUNITY GUIDANCE, supra note 20, at 14.  
 76. See supra note 40 and accompanying text. 
 77. See Erlanger, supra note 69 (noting that waiver is granted about half the time).  
 78. See infra notes 82–87 and accompanying text (demonstrating the importance of diplomatic 
relations in granting a waiver). 
 79. See infra notes 82–87 and accompanying text (granting waiver following a teenage girl’s death 
in a drunk driving accident when the driver was driving seventy-four miles per hour in a twenty-five-
mile-per-hour zone).  
 80. See DIPLOMATIC IMMUNITY GUIDANCE, supra note 20, at 14 (stating the State Department’s 
ability to get a waiver depends “to a large degree on the strength (and documentation) of the case at 
issue”).  
 81. See Ellen Barry & Benjamin Weiser, As Indian Diplomat Exits After Arrest, a Culture Clash 
Lingers, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 10, 2014), https://www.nytimes.com/2014/01/11/world/asia/indian-diplomat-
flies-home-after-indictment-in-us.html [https://perma.cc/A6LN-J5L6] (explaining the tension arising from 
the arrest of an Indian foreign official and India’s refusal to grant a waiver).  
 82. Charlie Savage, Pakistan Case Tests Laws on Diplomatic Immunity, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 22, 
2011), https://www.nytimes.com/2011/02/23/world/asia/23immunity.html [https://perma.cc/MPQ3-
YCBW]; Usborne, supra note 72.  
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aid sent to Georgia annually.83 Although there was little doubt that the State 
Department would formally request a waiver, most did not expect the 
Georgian government to comply.84 But Georgia did waive Makharadze’s 
immunity, and he was then prosecuted and pled guilty to involuntary 
manslaughter.85 In making this decision, Georgian President Eduard 
Shevardnadze noted that he considered the “seriousness” of the accident, 
Makharadze’s “obvious” guilt, and a wish not to obstruct U.S. efforts to 
prosecute Makharadze.86 The Georgian government also emphasized its 
interest in maintaining friendly relations with the United States.87  
When a sending state denies a request for waiver of diplomatic 
immunity, the United States may designate a diplomat persona non grata,88 
meaning that the individual is “unacceptable” or unwelcome in the receiving 
state.89 Following a persona non grata designation, the diplomat is expelled 
from the receiving state.90 This does not permit the diplomat’s prosecution—
as he or she does not lose diplomatic status—just their ability to remain in 
the receiving state.91 The Vienna Convention requires no formal procedure 
or evidence to support such a determination, leaving this measure entirely up 
to the discretion of the U.S. State Department.92 In practice, the United States 
has seldom utilized this tool, seemingly due to its potential adverse effects 
on diplomatic relations.93  
 
 83. Usborne, supra note 72.  
 84. Id.  
 85. Savage, supra note 82.  
 86. Michael Janofsky, Georgian Diplomat Pleads Guilty in Death of Teen-Age Girl, N.Y. TIMES 
(Oct. 9, 1997), https://www.nytimes.com/1997/10/09/us/georgian-diplomat-pleads-guilty-in-death-of-
teen-age-girl.html [https://perma.cc/32LB-TM4X]. 
 87. See Steven Lee Myers, Georgia Prepared To Waive Immunity of a Top Diplomat, N.Y. TIMES 
(Jan. 11, 1997), https://www.nytimes.com/1997/01/11/us/georgia-prepared-to-waive-immunity-of-a-
top-diplomat.html [https://perma.cc/4BG5-9MDL] (“Georgia has acceded to the deep concerns of the 
United States . . . and therefore is prepared to waive immunity in this case in the interest of U.S.-Georgian 
relations . . . .” (statement of the Georgian Embassy to the United States)).  
 88. Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations, supra note 42, art. 9.  
 89. DENZA, supra note 19, at 49.  
 90. Ross, supra note 41, at 188.  
 91. Presidential Power To Expel Diplomatic Personnel from the United States, 4A Op. O.L.C. 207, 
207 (1980) [hereinafter Presidential Power To Expel Diplomatic Personnel].  
 92. See Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations, supra note 42, art. 9(1) (explaining that the 
host state may designate a diplomat persona non grata “at any time and without having to explain its 
decision”).  
 93. Ross, supra note 41, at 188. But see Laurel Wamsley, U.S. Expels 60 Russian Officials, Closes 
Consulate in Seattle, NPR (Mar. 26, 2018, 9:00 AM), https://www.npr.org/sections/thetwo-
way/2018/03/26/596966272/us-expels-dozens-of-russian-diplomats-closes-consulate-in-seattle 
[https://perma.cc/U592-DB7W] (designating sixty Russian officials personae non gratae and closing the 
Russian consulate in Seattle after the poisoning of a former Russian spy and his daughter in England).  
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II.  THE LEGALITY OF A RETROACTIVE APPLICATION OF DIPLOMATIC 
IMMUNITY 
This Part argues that the purpose of the Vienna Convention on 
Diplomatic Relations and its codification in the Diplomatic Relations Act 
cuts against a retroactive application of diplomatic immunity. Yet, federal 
courts have repeatedly refused to make factual determinations regarding an 
individual’s diplomatic status, instead choosing to defer to State Department 
certifications under the political question doctrine. In this way, federal courts 
have—at least indirectly—allowed the practice of retroactive diplomatic 
immunity to stand on two occasions. After discussing these two cases, this 
Part then explains that both retroactive diplomatic immunity and judicial 
deference under the political question doctrine are ripe for abuse and 
inconsistent with other forms of immunity present in the U.S. legal system, 
including presidential immunity, qualified immunity, and defense witness 
immunity.  
A. Retroactive Diplomatic Immunity Under the Vienna Convention on 
Diplomatic Relations 
The Vienna Convention does not address retroactive diplomatic 
immunity.94 In debating the Diplomatic Relations Act more than a decade 
after the United States signed the Vienna Convention, not a single member 
of Congress appeared to anticipate retroactive diplomatic immunity.95 
Rather, congresspersons were primarily concerned with requiring diplomats 
to have a certain level of liability insurance to compensate victims of traffic 
accidents.96 Members of Congress might have found a retroactive grant of 
diplomatic immunity to be absurd because such a grant runs squarely afoul 
of the Vienna Convention’s stated objective: “[T]he purpose of [diplomatic] 
privileges and immunities is not to benefit individuals but to ensure the 
efficient performance of the functions of diplomatic missions as representing 
 
 94. See generally Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations, supra note 42 (lacking any mention 
of diplomatic immunity). For purposes of this Part, retroactive diplomatic immunity refers to the 
phenomenon of an individual who is factually not a diplomat obtaining diplomatic status and its attendant 
privileges and immunities for the purpose of immunizing past wrongful conduct.  
 95. See generally LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS ACT, supra note 45 
(lacking any mention of a retroactive application of diplomatic immunity).  
 96. See, e.g., id. at 29 (“Perhaps the most dramatic of [diplomatic] incidents have involved 
automobile accidents in which American citizens not at fault have suffered enormous damage and injury 
but have been unable to collect any compensation whatever. The whole burden of the accident has fallen 
on its innocent victim.” (statement of Sen. Paul Sarbanes)).  
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States[.]”97 A retroactive grant of immunity serves the individual—not 
diplomatic functions—because the individual was not a diplomat and 
therefore had no official functions when the alleged wrongful conduct 
occurred. Granting diplomatic immunity for the purpose of evading a lawsuit 
or criminal prosecution in no way promotes the Vienna Convention’s other 
stated purpose of “maintain[ing] . . . international peace and security, and the 
promotion of friendly relations among nations.”98  
Retroactive diplomatic immunity is similarly inconsistent with the 
historic rationales for diplomatic immunity—personal representation, 
extraterritoriality, and functional necessity.99 A retroactive grant of 
diplomatic immunity does not promote the diplomat personifying the power 
and sanctity of the royal prince because the individual seeking a retroactive 
application never actually represented the foreign government—or 
“prince”—in connection with the conduct the individual seeks to 
immunize.100 Extraterritoriality, for its part, refers to the legal fiction that the 
diplomat does not actually reside in the receiving state but rather is a 
passerby not subject to local law.101 Although true diplomats may not be 
subject to the jurisdiction of the United States, they are typically subject to 
the jurisdiction of their home countries.102 This would also be the case for a 
person seeking retroactive diplomatic immunity, but the pragmatic 
consequences would likely be much different. Because the diplomat would 
be immune in the United States after committing the conduct in question 
and—even where the act is a crime in the sending state—would not likely be 
prosecuted in the same foreign country that just granted the individual a 
major favor in the form of diplomatic status, such an individual could 
 
 97. Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations, supra note 42, pmbl. (emphasis omitted) 
(emphasis added). The legislative history of the Diplomatic Relations Act similarly supports this purpose. 
See, e.g., LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS ACT, supra note 45, at 32 (“I approve 
of the scope of diplomatic immunity provided by the Vienna Convention and recognize that the purpose 
of such immunity is not to benefit individuals, but to insure the efficient performance of diplomatic 
duties.” (statement of Sen. Charles Mathias)).  
 98. Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations, supra note 42, pmbl. Arguably, however, 
retroactive grants of diplomatic immunity may promote international peace by avoiding conflicts over an 
individual’s diplomatic status.  
 99. These theories are discussed in depth supra Part I.A.  
 100. See DAVID B. MICHAELS, INTERNATIONAL PRIVILEGES AND IMMUNITIES: A CASE FOR A 
UNIVERSAL STATUTE 47–48 (1971) (explaining the theory of personal representation).  
 101. Yu-Long Ling, A Comparative Study of the Privileges and Immunities of United Nations 
Member Representatives and Officials with the Traditional Privileges and Immunities of Diplomatic 
Agents, 33 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 91, 93–94 (1976) (“Exterritoriality means that diplomatic envoys must 
be treated as if they are still living in the territory of the sending state.”).  
 102. MCCLANAHAN, supra note 34, at 136 (“A limitation on diplomatic immunity . . . lies in the lack 
of immunity of all diplomats from the jurisdiction and laws of their own governments.”).  
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potentially evade all consequences for his or her wrongdoing. Finally, 
retroactive diplomatic immunity fails under the theory of functional 
necessity for the simple reason that the individual seeking immunity could 
not have been performing functions needing protection when the alleged 
wrongful conduct occurred, as the individual was not in fact a diplomat 
performing diplomatic services.103  
B. Reviewability of State Department Certificates and the Political 
Question Doctrine 
Despite the fact that retroactive diplomatic immunity cuts against the 
very purpose of the Vienna Convention, it may nonetheless prevail in court. 
This is because, under the political question doctrine, “some issues which 
prima facie and by usual criteria would seem to be for the courts, will not be 
decided by them but, extra-ordinarily, [are] left for political decision.”104 In 
Baker v. Carr,105 the Supreme Court spelled out six factors courts should 
consider when determining whether a case is justiciable under the political 
question doctrine.106 These include “a textually demonstrable constitutional 
commitment of the issue to a coordinate political department . . . or a lack of 
judicially discoverable and manageable standards for resolving [the issue]” 
and several prudential factors.107 In recent years, however, the Supreme 
Court has disregarded the prudential concerns in favor of the first two 
factors.108 The political question doctrine arose primarily out of a concern 
for separation of powers.109 Yet some critics consider the doctrine an 
objectionable dereliction of federal courts’ Article III duties.110  
Invoking the political question doctrine, federal courts have long 
deferred to the executive branch on questions of foreign relations,111 
 
 103. See supra notes 30–35 and accompanying text (discussing functional necessity).  
 104. Louis Henkin, Is There a “Political Question” Doctrine?, 85 YALE L.J. 597, 599 (1976).  
 105. Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962).  
 106. Id. at 217.  
 107. Id. The prudential concerns that favor finding a case nonjusticiable under the political question 
doctrine include “the impossibility of deciding [the issue] without an initial policy determination of a 
kind clearly for nonjudicial discretion,” “the impossibility of a court’s undertaking independent resolution 
without expressing lack of the respect due coordinate branches of government,” “an unusual need for 
unquestioning adherence to a political decision already made,” and “the potentiality of embarrassment 
from multifarious pronouncements by various departments on one question.” Id.  
 108. BRADLEY & GOLDSMITH, supra note 14, at 66; see also infra notes 249–50 and accompanying 
text (discussing Zivotofsky ex rel. Zivotofsky v. Clinton (Zivotofsky I), 566 U.S. 189 (2012)).  
 109. Henkin, supra note 104, at 597. 
 110. See infra notes 242–49 and accompanying text (examining criticisms of the political question 
doctrine).  
 111. See, e.g., El-Shifa Pharm. Indus. Co. v. United States, 607 F.3d 836, 844 (D.C. Cir. 2010) 
(“[C]ourts cannot reconsider the wisdom of discretionary foreign policy decisions.”); see also Beth 
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including whether an individual is a diplomat entitled to diplomatic 
immunity.112 In fact, courts have held that diplomatic status is established by 
a mere recognition of such by the State Department and that courts should 
not assess the facts when such certification exists113—even in the presence 
of potential fraud.114 Although the vast majority of State Department 
certifications of diplomatic status are valid,115 there are a number of reasons 
why the State Department might—knowingly or otherwise—enable 
retroactive diplomatic immunity. These may include the State Department’s 
own genuine error, lack of resources, information asymmetry regarding the 
individual’s wrongdoing prior to the request for diplomatic status,116 the 
State Department’s desire to avoid a foreign-relations debacle over a single 
individual’s diplomatic status,117 or corruption.118  
 
Stephens, The Modern Common Law of Foreign Official Immunity, 79 FORDHAM L. REV. 2669, 2710 
(2011) (“In cases touching upon foreign affairs, the courts generally give deference to the views of the 
Executive Branch . . . .”).  
 112. See, e.g., In re Baiz, 135 U.S. 403, 421 (1890) (“[T]he certificate of the Secretary of State . . . is 
the best evidence to prove the diplomatic character of a person . . . .”); United States v. Lumumba, 741 
F.2d 12, 15 (2d Cir. 1984) (“[R]ecognition by the executive branch—not to be second-guessed by the 
judiciary—is essential to establishing diplomatic status.”); Carrera v. Carrera, 174 F.2d 496, 497 (D.C. 
Cir. 1949) (“It is enough that an ambassador has requested immunity, that the State Department has 
recognized that the person for whom it was requested is entitled to it, and that the Department’s 
recognition has been communicated to the court.”); De Sousa v. Dep’t of State, 840 F. Supp. 2d 92, 106 
(D.D.C. 2012) (“The plaintiff’s entitlement to immunity, however, is a political question that lies beyond 
the competence of this Court.”).  
 113. See Ali v. Dist. Dir., 743 F. App’x 354, 358 (11th Cir. 2018) (“In the United States in particular, 
a person’s diplomatic status is established when it is recognized by the Department of State.” (quotations 
and citations omitted)); Zdravkovich v. Consul Gen. of Yugoslavia, No. 98-7034, 1998 U.S. App. LEXIS 
15466, at *2 (D.C. Cir. June 23, 1998) (per curiam) (“The courts are required to accept the State 
Department’s determination that a foreign official possesses diplomatic immunity from suit.” (emphasis 
added)).  
 114. See Gonzalez Paredes v. Vila, 497 F. Supp. 2d 187, 194 (D.D.C. 2007) (rejecting the possibility 
of fraud as an exception to diplomatic immunity that would allow a court to revoke or question a 
diplomat’s status).  
 115. See generally U.S. DEP’T OF STATE: OFF. OF FOREIGN MISSIONS, ACCREDITATION POLICY 
HANDBOOK (2018) (explaining the State Department’s extensive accreditation process).  
 116. Cf. Robbie Gramer, Dan De Luce & Colum Lynch, How the Trump Administration Broke the 
State Department, FOREIGN POL’Y (July 31, 2017), https://foreignpolicy.com/2017/07/31/how-the-
trump-administration-broke-the-state-department [https://perma.cc/R5QG-FWT9] (discussing the firing 
of a number of State Department employees, the “White House . . . slashing [the State Department’s] 
budget,” and a number of crucial positions left unfilled).  
 117. See, e.g., Ellen Barry, India Tires of Diplomatic Rift over Arrest of Devyani Khobragade, N.Y. 
TIMES (Dec. 20, 2014), https://www.nytimes.com/2014/12/21/world/asia/india-tires-of-diplomatic-rift-
over-arrest.html [https://perma.cc/4D5H-JG6J] (providing an example where the State Department 
granted an individual diplomatic status for foreign-policy reasons).  
 118. Cf. Devan Cole, US Government Scores Worst Mark Since 2011 in Global Corruption Survey, 
CNN (Jan. 29, 2019, 3:01 PM), https://www.cnn.com/2019/01/29/politics/us-corruption-
rating/index.html [https://perma.cc/M6WC-AEFT] (discussing corruption in the U.S. government); Jay 
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Although this potential for error exists, federal courts have continued to 
dismiss cases involving State Department certifications—even where said 
certifications were both legally and factually dubious.119 This Section 
discusses two cases, Abdulaziz v. Metropolitan Dade County120 and United 
States v. Khobragade,121 in which the Eleventh Circuit and Southern District 
of New York, respectively, implicitly refused to address whether diplomatic 
immunity can be sustained when such status has been retroactively afforded 
by the State Department. These two cases, which are the only federal or state 
cases involving a retroactive application of diplomatic immunity,122 
demonstrate that despite the absurdity of such an application under the 
Vienna Convention,123 lack of judicial review enables this conduct to persist.  
1. Abdulaziz v. Metropolitan Dade County.  In late February 1982, a 
Florida State Attorney’s office obtained a warrant to search Turki bin 
Abdulaziz’s home, on the basis that Abdulaziz was holding a woman there 
“against her will.”124 The State Attorney’s office obtained the search warrant 
only after learning from the U.S. State Department that Abdulaziz, a member 
of the Saudi royal family, did not have diplomatic immunity.125 When police 
 
Cost, The Swamp Isn’t Easy To Drain, ATLANTIC (July 14, 2018), https://www.theatlantic.com/
ideas/archive/2018/07/the-swamp-isnt-easy-to-drain/565151 [https:// 
perma.cc/M6WC-AEFT] (same); Ayesha Rascoe, Trump Says He’s Concerned About Corruption, but 
Advocates Say His Record Is Weak, NPR (Oct. 9, 2019, 5:43 AM), 
https://www.npr.org/2019/10/09/768134196/trump-says-hes-concerned-about-corruption-but-advocates-say-
his-record-is-weak [https://perma.cc/A77R-M9MV] (same). 
 119. See, e.g., Fun v. Pulgar, 993 F. Supp. 2d 470, 473–74 (D.N.J. 2014) (disregarding the fact that 
the defendant’s post as a diplomat may have been terminated by the sending state prior to the case at 
hand).  
 120. Abdulaziz v. Metro. Dade Cty., 741 F.2d 1328 (11th Cir. 1984). 
 121. United States v. Khobragade, 15 F. Supp. 3d 383 (S.D.N.Y. 2014).  
 122. These cases were discovered by combing through the results of the following Westlaw search: 
“adv: “diplomatic immunity”.” There is arguably one other federal case that involves a retroactive 
application of diplomatic immunity. See generally Republic of Phil. v. Marcos, 665 F. Supp. 793 (N.D. 
Cal. 1987). However, this Note does not discuss Marcos as it is actually a case of foreign sovereign 
official immunity, and therefore is not applicable. See id. at 795 (involving a subpoena served upon the 
Filipino Solicitor General regarding a lawsuit filed against the former president of the Philippines). Other 
grants of retroactive grants of diplomatic immunity may exist, perhaps unknown and unpublished because 
the plaintiff or government failed to pursue claims in light of the potential defendant’s new diplomatic 
status.  
 123. See supra Part II.A.  
 124. Abdulaziz, 741 F.2d at 1330.  
 125. Id. Abdulaziz was the brother of King Salman of Saudi Arabia and had last worked in the Saudi 
Arabian government approximately four years prior to the conduct and case at issue. See Condolences 
Pour in from Across World on Death of Prince Turki bin Abdulaziz, ARAB NEWS (Nov. 14, 2016, 12:00 
AM), http://www.arabnews.com/node/1010556/saudi-arabia [https://perma.cc/X2WB-Z5BT] (noting 
that Abdulaziz served as Saudi Arabia’s “deputy minister of defense from 1968 to 1978”).  
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officers showed up at Abdulaziz’s home to execute the warrant, they were 
met with armed guards, and a kerfuffle ensued.126  
On March 2, 1982, Abdulaziz and his family brought suit against 
Miami-Dade County and the police officers involved in the search, alleging 
violations of their Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment rights.127 The 
defendant police officers then counterclaimed on March 11, 1982, “alleging 
injuries from the encounter.”128 However, on April 1, 1982, at the request of 
the Saudi government and a few weeks after the counterclaim was filed, the 
State Department then certified that Abdulaziz and his family were entitled 
to diplomatic status.129 At that point, Abdulaziz moved to dismiss both his 
complaint and the defendants’ counterclaim on grounds of diplomatic 
immunity from suit.130 The defendants argued that the counterclaim should 
not be dismissed, “assert[ing] that the immunity was unsubstantiated 
[and] . . . waived.”131  
The court held that the State Department’s certification of Abdulaziz’s 
diplomatic status, after the alleged wrongdoing occurred and after the trial 
had already begun, was determinative.132 It did not matter that the State 
Department had affirmed Abdulaziz’s lack of diplomatic status leading up to 
the attempted search of his home.133 It did not matter that Abdulaziz had not 
carried out any diplomatic functions while living in the United States.134 And 
it did not matter that, for all intents and purposes, Abdulaziz was not a 
diplomat.135 
Rather, the court relied on language from the Senate Report on the 
Diplomatic Relations Act, which “indictate[d] that § 254d [of the Act] 
intend[ed] dismissal by a court . . . of any action or proceeding where 
 
 126. Abdulaziz, 741 F.2d at 1330. Although the facts are unclear as to what happened at Abdulaziz’s 
home, some have characterized it as a “brawl.” See Gregory Jaynes, Royal Saudi Family in Miami Shows 
It Has a Gift for Giving, N.Y. TIMES (May 27, 1982), https://www.nytimes.com/1982/05/27/us/royal-saudi-
family-in-miami-shows-it-has-a-gift-for-giving.html [https://perma.cc/AM8H-J4KC]. One of the police 
officers claimed he was “kicked and spat upon.” Id.  
 127. Abdulaziz, 741 F.2d at 1330.  
 128. Id.  
 129. Id.  
 130. Id. Abdulaziz likely moved to dismiss his own complaint as well because, under the Diplomatic 
Relations Act, filing an initial complaint constitutes waiver of diplomatic immunity in regard to any 
resulting counterclaims. See supra note 64 and accompanying text.  
 131. Abdulaziz, 741 F.2d at 1330.  
 132. See id. at 1332 (regarding Abdulaziz’s later grant of immunity as conclusive).  
 133. See id.  
 134. See id.  
 135. See id.  
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immunity is found to exist.”136 The court found that the State Department 
certification was enough to satisfy this “existence” requirement because—
presumably under the political question doctrine—“courts have generally 
accepted as conclusive the views of the State Department as to the fact of 
diplomatic status.”137 The court further based its reasoning on the fact that 
Abdulaziz was eligible for but had not yet “been granted diplomatic status at 
the time he initiated his . . . suit,”138 all the while disregarding that, 
theoretically, thousands of nondiplomats would similarly be eligible.139  
In its affirmance of the district court’s dismissal of the case, the 
Eleventh Circuit explained that “once the . . . Department of State has 
regularly certified a visitor . . . as having diplomatic status, the courts are 
bound to accept that determination, and that the diplomatic 
immunity . . . serves as a defense to suits already commenced.”140 And so, 
despite irregular evidence, the Eleventh Circuit refused to analyze the facts 
in concluding that Abdulaziz was someone who was “regularly certified” as 
a diplomat so as to necessitate dismissal.141  
Following this decision, Abdulaziz has been routinely cited for the 
proposition that courts must accord substantial deference to State 
Department determinations of diplomatic status.142 However, no federal or 
 
 136. Id. at 1331 (quotations and citation omitted). 
 137. Id. Although the court is relatively conclusory in its opinion and does not expressly state that it 
is dismissing the case on political question grounds, practically, it is. Courts often view issues relating to 
foreign affairs as nonjusticiable political questions warranting dismissal. See PETER W. LOW, JOHN C. 
JEFFRIES, JR. & CURTIS A. BRADLEY, FEDERAL COURTS AND THE LAW OF FEDERAL-STATE RELATIONS 
482 (9th ed. 2018) (“In Baker v. Carr, the [Supreme] Court acknowledged that foreign affairs was an area 
where the political question doctrine might have particular salience.”); see also Linda Champlin & Alan 
Schwarz, Political Question Doctrine and Allocation of the Foreign Affairs Power, 13 HOFSTRA L. REV. 
215, 217 (1985) (noting that although the political question doctrine “has been cut back in other areas, 
the doctrine is thriving and growing in its application to the foreign relations power.”). Although the 
outcome of dismissal is the same, over time, courts have differed in how they describe the treatment of 
cases involving foreign affairs. For example, “[i]n some cases, . . . the courts simply treat[] the 
government’s decision as an unreviewable fact. In others, as with those that challenge[] the powers of 
particular branches of government, the courts abstain[] from hearing the case altogether.” Harlan Grant 
Cohen, A Politics-Reinforcing Political Question Doctrine, 49 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1, 11 (2017).  
 138. Abdulaziz, 741 F.2d at 1331.  
 139. The State Department itself claims—perhaps facetiously—that “everyone” can be a diplomat. 
Who Else Can Be a Diplomat? Everyone!, U.S. DEP’T STATE: DISCOVER DIPLOMACY, 
https://diplomacy.state.gov/diplomacy/who-else-can-be-a-diplomat-everyone [https://perma.cc/75JY-
UCWL]. The Vienna Convention itself does not specify any absolute requirements for an individual to 
qualify as a diplomat. See generally Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations, supra note 42 (lacking 
any mention of education or work-experience requirements, for example).  
 140. Abdulaziz, 741 F.2d at 1329–30 (emphasis added).  
 141. Id. 
 142. See, e.g., United States v. Al-Hamdi, 356 F.3d 564, 571 (4th Cir. 2004) (explaining that the 
State Department has wide discretion in classifying diplomats).  
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state court relied on Abdulaziz for the proposition that diplomatic immunity 
may apply retroactively for persons who arguably are not diplomats and were 
not diplomats at the time of the act in controversy for another thirty years, 
until the Khobragade scandal.  
2. United States v. Khobragade.  On December 12, 2013, Devyani 
Khobragade, a deputy consul general at the Indian consulate in New York 
City, was arrested on charges of “visa fraud and making false statements to 
the government,”143 causing a veritable “diplomatic rift” between India and 
the United States.144 Immediately following the arrest, Indian news outlets 
decried Khobragade’s arrest,145 leading to Indian officials removing the 
security barriers around the U.S. Embassy in India and revoking certain 
privileges accorded to U.S. diplomats.146 The scandal culminated in the 
resignation of U.S. Ambassador to India Nancy Jo Powell.147 The Indian 
media particularly condemned the fact that Khobragade was arrested, 
handcuffed, strip-searched, and kept in a holding cell before being released 
on bond,148 something U.S. officials said was simply standard protocol.149  
Looking behind the relatively mundane charge of visa fraud, the reality 
of Khobragade’s offense is far more troubling. The visa in question was 
obtained for Khobragade’s domestic worker, Sangeeta Richard.150 Richard 
immigrated to the United States from India to work as Khobragade’s 
 
 143. United States v. Khobragade, 15 F. Supp. 3d 383, 383 (S.D.N.Y. 2014).  
 144. Ellen Barry, India Tires of Diplomatic Rift over Arrest of Devyani Khobragade, N.Y TIMES 
(Dec. 20, 2014), https://www.nytimes.com/2014/12/21/world/asia/india-tires-of-diplomatic-rift-over-
arrest.html [https://perma.cc/ZDA3-ZECL].  
 145. See, e.g., Namrata Brar, Devyani Khobragade Case: She Was Strip Searched ‘Like Other 
Arrestees’ Say US Marshals, NDTV (Dec. 18, 2013, 7:09 PM), https://www.ndtv.com/india-
news/devyani-khobragade-case-she-was-strip-searched-like-other-arrestees-say-us-marshals-544910 
[https://perma.cc/RE66-ZL78] (describing Khobragade’s arrest as inexplicable and humiliating); Arpita 
De, Who Is Devyani Khobragade?, TIMES INDIA (Dec. 20, 2013, 7:09 PM), 
https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/india/Who-is-Devyani-Khobragade/articleshow/27659238.cms 
[https://perma.cc/KK5R-FL7R] (characterizing Khobragade’s arrest and its aftermath as “an assault on 
her person and her reputation”).  
 146. In the midst of the Khobragade affair, Indian officials revoked the U.S. Embassy’s “food and 
alcohol import privileges” and the right of American consular employees to be free from arrest for certain 
offenses. Barry & Weiser, supra note 81.  
 147. See Barry, supra note 144 (noting that Ambassador Powell’s resignation “was widely seen here 
as fallout from the imbroglio”).  
 148. Barry & Weiser, supra note 81. 
 149. Gardiner Harris, Outrage in India, and Retaliation, over a Female Diplomat’s Arrest in New 
York, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 17, 2013), https://www.nytimes.com/2013/12/18/world/asia/outrage-in-india-
over-female-diplomats-arrest-in-new-york.html [https://perma.cc/H7JR-N8SJ]. 
 150. Barry & Weiser, supra note 81. 
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childcare provider and occasional housekeeper.151 In obtaining an A-3 visa 
on Richard’s behalf, Khobragade confirmed to the U.S. government that 
Richard’s working conditions would comply with U.S. labor laws, meaning 
she would pay Richard at least minimum wage and overtime when 
applicable.152 But Richard did not receive even the bare minimum. Rather, 
Richard was often forced to work over one hundred hours per week—with 
no days off—and at an hourly wage of $1.42.153 Contrary to what 
Khobragade maintained in the visa application, Richard did not receive any 
holidays, sick days, or vacation days.154 Khobragade also declined to return 
Richard’s passport to her “despite several requests” to do so.155 After 
Khobragade refused to pay Richard $9.75 per hour—the wage stipulated in 
the employment contract presented to the U.S. government—or terminate 
Richard’s employment and allow her to return to India as she requested on 
several occasions, Richard fled.156 
Richard is not alone in the treatment she endured while working for 
Khobragade. In fact, the trafficking and abuse of domestic workers by 
foreign officials has become an issue in the United States.157 In the last 
decade, domestic workers have filed approximately twenty lawsuits against 
diplomats and other foreign envoys living in the United States.158 This 
number likely does not represent the scope of the problem, as cases often go 
unreported and “[s]ome workers may only rarely be allowed to leave the 
home or make contact with outsiders, or may have little knowledge of their 
rights.”159 Despite the severity of these circumstances, some commentators 
 
 151. Indictment at 3–7, United States v. Khobragade, 15 F. Supp. 3d 383 (S.D.N.Y. 2014) (No. 14-
Crim-008) [hereinafter Indictment].  
 152. Id. at 3–4.  
 153. Id. at 3.  
 154. Id. at 10, 14. 
 155. Id. (alleging that during one conversation, Khobragade told Richard she would only return her 
passport once her three-year employment elapsed, in violation of U.S. law).  
 156. Id. at 16.  
 157. See Vandenberg & Bessell, supra note 67, at 596–99 (explaining that “many diplomatic 
trafficking cases are never criminally prosecuted” and that significant improvement is needed in the 
enforcement of such cases). Research from the Institute for Policy Studies in Washington, D.C. shows 
that domestic workers employed by foreign officials commonly “have their passports taken away, [are] 
barred from contacting friends[,] and . . . earn salaries of $100 to $400 a month.” Somini Sengupta, An 
Immigrant’s Legal Enterprise; In Suing Employer, Maid Fights Diplomatic Immunity, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 
12, 2000), https://www.nytimes.com/2000/01/12/nyregion/immigrant-s-legal-enterprise-suing-
employer-maid-fights-diplomatic-immunity.html [https://perma.cc/B4KH-85GV].  
 158. Benjamin Weiser & Vivian Yee, Claim Against Indian Diplomat Has Echoes of Previous Cases, 
N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 9, 2014), https://www.nytimes.com/2014/01/10/nyregion/claims-of-diplomats-
mistreating-household-staff-are-far-from-the-first.html [https://perma.cc/34DU-KNB3].  
 159. Id.  
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explain away the mistreatment of domestic workers as merely a difference 
in culture.160  
But Richard’s case was reported, and the U.S. Attorney’s Office for the 
Southern District of New York filed an indictment against Khobragade on 
January 9, 2014.161 Khobragade promptly moved to dismiss the indictment, 
claiming diplomatic immunity162 even though she was a consular officer—
not a diplomat—when she allegedly violated U.S. law, when she was being 
investigated, and when she was arrested.163 Consuls are entitled to 
significantly lesser protections under the Vienna Convention on Consular 
Relations, at least partially because “[c]onsular officials are . . . thought of 
as administrators, rather than diplomats.”164 The Vienna Convention on 
Consular Relations immunizes consuls only as to their official acts, and, 
unlike diplomats, they may be arrested and detained under certain 
circumstances.165 Also unlike diplomats, the property of consular officers 
may be searched under the appropriate constitutional restraints, and consular 
immunity does not extend to a consul’s family members.166 Therefore, when, 
as a consular officer, Khobragade allegedly committed visa fraud and made 
false statements to the government, she was not immune from arrest or 
prosecution for such actions.167  
 
 160. See, e.g., Harris, supra note 149. Harris argues that “[i]t is not unusual in India for domestic 
staff to be paid poorly and be required to work more than 60 hours a week,” and “[r]eports of maids being 
imprisoned or abused by their employers are frequent.” Id. On the other hand, “the idea of a middle-class 
woman being arrested and ordered to disrobe is seen as shocking. Airport security procedures in India 
provide separate lines for women, and any pat-down searches are performed behind curtains.” Id. 
 161. Indictment, supra note 151, at 1.  
 162. United States v. Khobragade, 15 F. Supp. 3d 383, 383 (S.D.N.Y. 2014).  
 163. See id. at 383–84 (“Khobragade . . . served as a consular officer in the United States from 
October 26, 2012 through January 8, 2014, a position that cloaked her with consular immunity . . . .” 
(footnote omitted)).  
 164. Savage, supra note 82; accord IRVIN STEWART, CONSULAR PRIVILEGES AND IMMUNITIES 9 
(1926) (“The consular regulations of many states expressly provide that the consul has no diplomatic 
character and forbid the invoking of the privileges of diplomatic agents.”). Typical functions of consular 
personnel include the “issuance of travel documents, attending to the difficulties of their own countrymen 
who are in the host country, and generally promoting the commerce of the sending country.” DIPLOMATIC 
IMMUNITY GUIDANCE, supra note 20, at 10. 
 165. See DIPLOMATIC IMMUNITY GUIDANCE, supra note 20, at 6–7 (explaining that consuls may be 
arrested for felonies when the arresting officer has a proper warrant).  
 166. Id. at 7. 
 167. Under the indictment, the alleged violations of 18 U.S.C. §§ 1001 and 1546 are felonies carrying 
sentences up to eight and fifteen years in prison, respectively. 18 U.S.C. §§ 1006, 1546 (2018); 
Indictment, supra note 151, at 19–20; Heather Timmons, Now That Devyani Khobragade Is Leaving the 
US, Is This the End of US-India Tensions?, QUARTZ (Jan. 9, 2014), https://qz.com/165510/will-devyani-
khobragades-departure-from-the-us-signal-the-end-of-us-india-tensions [https://perma.cc/5EA3-AB7H]. 
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However, on January 8, 2014, one day before the U.S. government filed 
its indictment against Khobragade—almost a month after her arrest and at 
least one year after the alleged wrongdoing began—the Indian government 
promoted Khobragade to a position that would cloak her with diplomatic 
status and its corresponding privileges.168 The next day, Khobragade 
returned to India, in turn divesting her of the purported diplomatic 
immunity.169 The U.S. government argued against Khobragade’s motion to 
dismiss on the ground that Khobragade was not a diplomat entitled to 
diplomatic immunity when she was arrested.170 The government supported 
this contention with a statement by Stephen Kerr, an Attorney-Adviser at the 
U.S. State Department’s Office of the Legal Adviser, who asserted that 
“Khobragade did not enjoy immunity from arrest or detention at the time of 
her arrest” and “does not presently enjoy immunity from prosecution for the 
crimes charged in the Indictment.”171 The court found Kerr’s declaration 
irrelevant, focusing rather on the fact that all parties, including the State 
Department, conceded that Khobragade was a diplomat on a single day: 
January 9, 2014, which also happened to be the day the indictment was 
filed.172 The court disregarded Khobragade’s status at the time of her arrest, 
instead relying on a prior State Department pronouncement that “criminal 
immunity precludes the exercise of jurisdiction by the courts over an 
individual whether the incident occurred prior to or during the period in 
which such immunity exists.”173 The court similarly found the Eleventh 
Circuit’s decision in Abdulaziz to stand for the position that “diplomatic 
immunity acquired during the pendency of proceedings destroys jurisdiction 
even if the suit was validly commenced before immunity applied.”174 The 
court declined to consider whether Khobragade was in fact a diplomat or 
whether Khobragade ever acted as a diplomat.175 The court also did not 
entertain why the State Department granted Khobragade diplomatic 
immunity for that single day in January or whether such an action was 
 
 168. Khobragade, 15 F. Supp. 3d at 384.  
 169. Id. at 386. When a foreign diplomat exits the United States, his or her diplomatic immunities 
and privileges customarily cease to exist. DENZA, supra note 19, at 354. 
 170. Khobragade, 15 F. Supp. 3d at 387.  
 171. Id.  
 172. See id. at 386–87 (“Even assuming Kerr’s conclusions to be correct, the case must be dismissed 
based on Khobragade’s conceded immunity on January 9, 2014.”).  
 173. Id. at 387 (quoting DIPLOMATIC IMMUNITY GUIDANCE, supra note 20, at 15).  
 174. See id. (explaining Abdulaziz provides “that diplomatic immunity serves as a defense to suits 
already commenced” (quotations omitted)). The court did not find the fact that the Abdulaziz case 
comprehended civil rather than criminal charges to be determinative. Id. at 388.  
 175. Id. at 387–88.  
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lawful.176 Instead, the court dismissed the indictment, concluding that 
diplomatic immunity is simply “a jurisdictional bar” warranting “dismiss[al 
of the] proceedings the moment immunity is acquired.”177 And so, for a 
second time, a federal court allowed a retroactive grant of diplomatic 
immunity in the name of following particular State Department 
determinations.178 
C. Abuse of Retroactive Diplomatic Immunity 
The principal problem with a retroactive application of diplomatic 
immunity is its potential for unfettered abuse. In both Abdulaziz and 
Khobragade, individuals were successfully able to garner diplomatic 
immunity after having allegedly committed serious crimes ranging from 
false imprisonment to mistreatment of domestic workers.179 The fact that 
courts have allowed such retroactive grants of diplomatic immunity enables 
its abuse. Recall the earlier hypothetical involving Monsieur Rich.180 Simply 
by virtue of his contact with a corrupt foreign government official, Madame 
Shady, who was then able to designate him as a foreign attaché, Monsieur 
Rich was able to immunize his past money laundering. This is all in spite of 
the fact that Monsieur Rich never acted as a diplomat and likely never would 
have performed any diplomatic functions. 
German tennis star and six-time Grand Slam titleholder, Boris Becker, 
attempted a similar scheme in 2018.181 Faced with creditors and bankruptcy 
in the United Kingdom, Becker pulled a trick right out of Monsieur Rich’s 
playbook and claimed diplomatic immunity from the English court’s 
jurisdiction.182 Becker informed the High Court in London that since the 
inception of its bankruptcy proceedings, the Central African Republic had 
appointed Becker to “Attaché to the European Union on sporting, cultural 
 
 176. See id. (lacking any explicit discussion to this effect). The State Department’s grant of 
diplomatic immunity to Khobragade has widely been seen as a move to assuage Indian anger in response 
to the incident, especially considering the State Department’s request that India waive the immunity and 
that Khobragade leave the country. See Barry, supra note 144 (“In an effort to resolve the dispute, the 
State Department granted Ms. Khobragade diplomatic immunity and told her to leave the country.”).  
 177. Khobragade, 15 F. Supp. 3d at 388.  
 178. See id. at 385 (summarizing the conception of the political question doctrine shared by other 
federal courts, providing that “where a person’s diplomatic status is contested, courts generally consider 
the State Department’s determination to be conclusive”). 
 179. See supra Part II.B (discussing the two cases).  
 180. See supra notes 5–6 and accompanying text.  
 181. Richard Pérez-Peña, Boris Becker Is an African Diplomat? His Creditors Are First To Know, 
N.Y. TIMES (June 15, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/06/15/world/europe/boris-becker-
diplomatic-immunity.html [https://perma.cc/M88C-QFDB]. 
 182. Id.  
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and humanitarian affairs,” a position he claimed immunized him from his 
past debts.183 In one interview, Becker candidly revealed that his reason for 
claiming diplomatic status was to evade the bankruptcy proceedings: “I have 
now asserted diplomatic immunity as I am in fact bound to do, in order to 
bring this farce to an end, so that I can start to rebuild my life.”184 The Central 
African Republic, for its part, is perceived as one of the most corrupt 
countries in the world.185 The Central African Republic’s own officials could 
not even agree on whether Becker was indeed an attaché.186 But without 
waiting for a court’s ruling, Becker dropped his claim of diplomatic 
immunity,187 perhaps due to the media attention it garnered when Becker 
may have preferred to go undetected.  
Not every case will be as high profile as Boris Becker’s. Still, the idea 
that diplomatic status may be so gameable is wholly contrary to the purposes 
of diplomatic immunity.188 The fact that diplomatic immunity can be 
accorded retroactively, once an individual has already committed a wrongful 
act and has had time to drum up ways to evade prosecution or suit, enables 
its abuse. Federal courts might do well to take note of this when faced with 
individuals whose diplomatic status is a genuine question of fact.  
D. Retroactive Applications of Other Forms of Immunity  
Diplomatic status is not the only legal mechanism providing immunities 
for certain allegedly wrongful acts—although it is likely the most expansive. 
Presidential immunity, qualified immunity, and defense witness immunity 
all immunize the holder from prosecution or suit. In comparing these three 
 
 183. Ben Emmerson (@BenEmmerson1), TWITTER (June 14, 2018, 11:08 AM), 
https://twitter.com/BenEmmerson1/status/1007323893433098241 [https://perma.cc/6RRF-AK8L] 
(statement of Boris Becker’s attorney).  
 184. Alexander Britton, Boris Becker Claims Diplomatic Immunity To Avoid Bankruptcy, 
INDEPENDENT (June 15, 2018, 1:42 AM), https://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/home-news/boris-
becker-diplomatic-immunity-bankruptcy-a8399731.html [https://perma.cc/F2MK-4XZ7].  
 185. Corruption Perceptions Index 2018, TRANSPARENCY INT’L, https://www.transparency.org/
cpi2018 [https://perma.cc/9KMZ-68FX] (ranking 149 out of 180 for most corrupt, where the 180th 
country is perceived to be the most corrupt country in the world).  
 186. See Siobhán O’Grady, Boris Becker Claims To Be a Central African Diplomat. Officials Say 
His Passport Is a Fake, WASH. POST (June 20, 2018), https://www.washingtonpost.com/
news/worldviews/wp/2018/06/20/boris-becker-claims-to-be-a-central-african-diplomat-officials-
there-say-his-passport-is-a-fake [https://perma.cc/4LLA-5PB3] (explaining that the Central African 
Republic’s Ambassador to the European Union confirmed Becker’s diplomatic status while other country 
officials indicated Becker’s diplomatic passport was fake).  
 187. Former Tennis Star Boris Becker Drops Immunity Claim, AP NEWS (Dec. 3, 2018), 
https://apnews.com/ce6c0169a6524be995cef12e659f3273 [https://perma.cc/564H-NXX7].  
 188. See supra Part II.A (explaining the policy rationales against such an application of diplomatic 
immunity).  
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instruments, none allow for a retroactive grant of immunity in the way that 
courts have enabled for diplomatic immunity. Indeed, the Supreme Court has 
previously explicitly denied retroactive application of presidential 
immunity189—a position that would appear much less manipulable than that 
of diplomats considering that one would have to be elected by millions to 
attain it. 
Historically, courts dismissed any case involving the U.S. president,190 
much like courts now dismiss suits filed against diplomats.191 The Watergate 
Scandal changed this. In United States v. Nixon,192 the Supreme Court held 
that, in some circumstances, the president may be appropriately subjected to 
judicial processes.193 Yet, the Supreme Court has held that the president has 
complete immunity when acting “within the outer perimeter of his [or her] 
official duties.”194 Rather than prosecution or suit, the response to serious, 
official presidential misconduct is impeachment.195 A primary purpose of 
presidential immunity revolves around “the idea that the constitutional 
orientation of a President’s responsibilities requires him [or her] to act, and 
those actions should be as unencumbered as possible.”196 Much like 
diplomatic immunity, the objective of presidential immunity is to allow the 
president to effectively perform his or her discretionary functions, without 
needing to repeatedly analyze them for possible liability.197  
Unlike diplomatic immunity, the Supreme Court has actually heard a 
case involving the retroactive application of presidential immunity. In 
Clinton v. Jones,198 the Court held that presidential immunity does not apply 
retroactively to actions taken before the president took office.199 In 1994, 
 
 189. See infra notes 198–205 and accompanying text. 
 190. Stephen L. Carter, The Political Aspects of Judicial Power: Some Notes on the Presidential 
Immunity Decision, 131 U. PA. L. REV. 1341, 1342 (1983).  
 191. See supra notes 104–14 and accompanying text.  
 192. United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683 (1974).  
 193. See id. at 697 (finding justiciable a subpoena of President Nixon’s tape recordings).  
 194. Douglas B. McKechnie, @POTUS: Rethinking Presidential Immunity in the Time of Twitter, 
72 U. MIAMI L. REV. 1, 4 (2017) (quotations omitted) (quoting Nixon v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 731, 756 
(1982)).  
 195. See Joseph Isenbergh, Impeachment and Presidential Immunity from Judicial Process, 18 YALE 
L. & POL’Y REV. 53, 100 (2000) (“Immunity from judicial process does not place the President above the 
law. The existence and breadth of impeachment . . . assure that the President is not above the law.”). In 
practice, punishment for presidential misconduct has historically come through unofficial channels, 
including “failure of reelection, or through trashing of the President’s . . . image.” Carter, supra note 190, 
at 1341.  
 196. McKechnie, supra note 194, at 25.  
 197. Id.  
 198. Clinton v. Jones, 520 U.S. 681 (1997).  
 199. See infra notes 203–05 and accompanying text. 
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Paula Corbin Jones, a former Arkansas state employee, filed a sexual 
harassment suit against President Bill Clinton.200 Although Clinton was 
president when Jones instituted the lawsuit, the alleged sexual harassment 
occurred prior to his presidency, when Clinton was Governor of Arkansas.201 
In response to Jones’s suit, President Clinton filed a motion to dismiss on 
presidential-immunity grounds.202 The Supreme Court affirmed the district 
court and the Eighth Circuit’s denial of the motion to dismiss, explaining that 
the president is not entitled to immunity for unofficial acts taken before the 
president took office.203 The Court then concluded that it would be a matter 
for Congress to extend presidential immunity to actions taken in an unofficial 
capacity.204 And so, despite the broad immunity granted to U.S. presidents,205 
the Supreme Court has declined to authorize retroactive grants of 
presidential immunity.  
Other state and federal government officials are also entitled to limited 
immunities. Under the doctrine of qualified immunity, state and federal 
officials are protected from certain civil liabilities when “performing 
discretionary functions . . . insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly 
established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person 
would have known.”206 Like diplomatic immunity, the purpose of qualified 
immunity is to protect the government official’s functions and not the 
individual in his or her personal capacity.207 With this purpose in mind, 
qualified immunity thus shields a government official only as to actions 
taken under the scope of the individual’s employment.208 Therefore, like with 
presidential immunity,209 a retroactive grant of qualified immunity would be 
unworkable. Actions taken before the individual became a government 
official are definitionally beyond the scope of employment and could not 
have been taken while performing official functions. Therefore, such actions 
could not be immunized.  
 
 200. Jones, 520 U.S. at 684–85.  
 201. Id.  
 202. Id. at 686.  
 203. See id. at 691–96, 710 (holding that functional immunity extends only to actions taken under 
office).  
 204. Id. at 709.  
 205. See supra notes 194–97 and accompanying text.  
 206. Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982).  
 207. Id. at 807 (“[T]he recognition of a qualified immunity defense . . . reflected an attempt . . . to 
protect officials who are required to exercise their discretion and the related public interest in encouraging 
the vigorous exercise of official authority.” (quotations omitted)).  
 208. Id. at 818.  
 209. See supra notes 190–205 and accompanying text (discussing presidential immunity).  
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Finally, defense witness immunity was established as a response to the 
Fifth Amendment bar against compelling an individual to provide self-
incriminating testimony.210 Because of the Fifth Amendment’s “broad 
scope,” the government saw it as a significant barrier to obtaining 
evidence.211 Defense witness immunity is used as a means of overcoming 
this barrier212 and is especially useful in prosecutions of organized crime and 
political corruption.213 Over time, two forms of defense witness immunity 
have arisen: transactional immunity and use immunity.214 Transactional 
immunity grants defense witnesses absolute immunity from prosecution for 
any crime—or transaction—brought up in the compelled witness’s 
testimony.215 This form of defense witness immunity became problematic, 
as it was so expansive that it was “easily abused.”216 Witnesses could, for 
example, “skillfully provoke[] a line of inquiry that allowed them to establish 
a complete record of their crimes and thus secure broad immunity.”217 This 
led to a shift in the late twentieth century toward use immunity,218 which 
immunizes the witness only to the extent that his or her testimony may not 
be used as evidence to later develop a case against the witness.219  
What is interesting about defense witness immunity is that from an 
initial perspective, it may appear as though its whole premise is retroactive 
in nature—the defense witness was not a witness when the wrongful act in 
question took place, and yet later receives immunity for that act. However, 
use immunity is better thought of as immunizing the witness’s testimony, and 
not the actions themselves.220 From that angle, the individual is already a 
 
 210. U.S. CONST. amend. V (“No person . . . shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness 
against himself . . . .”); Robin Deborah Mass, Note, Witness for the Defense: A Right to Immunity, 34 
VAND. L. REV. 1665, 1667–68 (1981).  
 211. Mass, supra note 210, at 1667.  
 212. Id. at 1668.  
 213. Clifford S. Fishman, Defense Witness As “Accomplice”: Should the Trial Judge Give a “Care 
and Caution” Instruction?, 96 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1, 2 (2005) (explaining that testimony by an 
accomplice is useful in the prosecution of organized crime and political corruption).  
 214. James F. Flanagan, Compelled Immunity for Defense Witnesses: Hidden Costs and Questions, 
56 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 447, 448–50 (1981) (providing an overview of the transition between 
transactional and use immunity).  
 215. Mass, supra note 210, at 1669.  
 216. See id. at 1672 (discussing one particular transactional-immunity statute).  
 217. Id.  
 218. See Rita Werner Gordon, Right to Immunity for Defense Witnesses, 20 CONN. L. REV. 153, 159 
(1987) (“A shift away from transactional immunity occurred in 1970 when Congress passed the Federal 
Immunity of Witnesses Act.”).  
 219. Mass, supra note 210, at 1669.  
 220. See Peter Lushing, Testimonial Immunity and the Privilege Against Self-Incrimination: A Study 
in Isomorphism, 73 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1690, 1690–92 (1982) (explaining that to bypass the 
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witness when the immunity is granted. And even in those rare cases where 
transactional immunity applies, having it apply to actions before the 
individual became a witness cannot be untethered from the concept of 
defense witness immunity—it would theoretically be impossible to designate 
someone as a future witness. To assume otherwise would be contrary to the 
fundamental nature of transactional immunity. Thus, courts should pause 
before denying review of retroactive grants of diplomatic immunity under 
the political question doctrine, as retroactive grants of analogous forms of 
immunity have either been expressly disapproved of by the Supreme Court 
or appear irreconcilable with their basic purposes.  
III.  THE SOLUTION TO RETROACTIVE DIPLOMATIC IMMUNITY 
All three branches of the federal government have the ability to address 
the problem of retroactive diplomatic immunity. The executive branch could 
continue its current efforts of limiting abuses of diplomatic immunity 
generally through State Department designations of diplomats as personae 
non gratae and requests for waiver. Congress could pass a statute requiring 
sending states to provide a list of all diplomats so as to determine immunities 
ex ante and avoid retroactive applications altogether. But neither of those 
approaches would prove as effortless or effective as a judicial solution. 
Because the known retroactive applications of diplomatic immunity have 
depended on the federal courts’ deference to the State Department on matters 
of foreign affairs, the judiciary could narrowly interpret the political question 
doctrine in cases involving diplomatic immunity. This would not only 
provide a means by which judges and juries could make legal and factual 
determinations as to whether an individual is indeed a diplomat entitled to 
diplomatic immunity, but also align diplomatic immunity with the 
retroactive treatment of other forms of immunity.221  
A. The Executive Solution 
One potential approach to the issue of retroactive diplomatic immunity 
would be to rely on existing remedies already designed to curb abuse of 
diplomatic immunity. Existing limits include the executive branch’s 
designation of an individual as persona non grata and requesting waiver of 
an individual’s diplomatic immunity.222 Designating an individual as 
 
Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination, only the witness’s testimony need be immunized, not 
the witness in his or her individual capacity).  
 221. See supra Part II.D (discussing the retroactive treatment of presidential immunity, qualified 
immunity, and defense witness immunity).  
 222. See supra Part I.C.  
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persona non grata effectively expels the diplomat from the receiving state,223 
which is especially useful in cases where the diplomat is seen as dangerous 
as when he or she has committed a violent crime. However, such a 
designation does not provide a way to prosecute or sue the individual in the 
receiving state,224 which may leave the victim without a remedy. Requesting 
that the sending state waive the individual’s immunities can similarly be 
ineffective because sending nations often refuse to grant them.225 States may 
be even less likely to grant waivers where the individual’s diplomatic status 
was accorded for corrupt means.226 Also, this approach does not necessarily 
account for situations in which an individual’s subversive use of a retroactive 
application of immunity goes undetected, as it relies entirely on State 
Department capabilities. In any case, as seen in Abdulaziz and Khobragade, 
the State Department cannot always be relied upon to correctly issue 
diplomatic certifications.227 
B. The Legislative Solution 
A more invasive approach would involve the enforcement of a 
diplomatic list requiring sending states to, ex ante, provide receiving states 
with a list of all their diplomats. Congress could pass a statute wherein 
individuals not on the diplomatic list would be unable to claim any immunity 
from civil or criminal prosecution, therefore effectively eradicating any sort 
of retroactive application. The U.S. State Department’s Office of the Chief 
 
 223. Ross, supra note 41, at 188; see also Philip Bump, How To Be Declared ‘Persona Non Grata’ 
and Get Yourself Kicked Out of the United States, WASH. POST (Dec. 29, 2016, 3:51 PM), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-fix/wp/2016/12/29/how-to-be-declared-a-persona-non 
-grata-and-get-yourself-kicked-out-of-the-united-states [https://perma.cc/T3LP-LSLM] (explaining how a 
designation of persona non grata effectively banishes a diplomat from the United States).  
 224. Presidential Power To Expel Diplomatic Personnel, supra note 91, at 207 (omitting the right to 
sue or prosecute the individual in the included powers). 
 225. See supra notes 77–81 and accompanying text. For a recent example of a foreign relations 
debacle involving a diplomatic immunity waiver request, see PM’s Plea to US To Rethink Immunity over 
Harry Dunn Fatal Crash, BBC (Oct. 7, 2019), https://www.bbc.com/news/uk-england-
northamptonshire-49961679 [https://perma.cc/7YD8-VRNJ] (involving the death of British teenager 
Harry Dunn following a crash allegedly caused by the wife of an American diplomat).  
 226. For instance, the Indian government denied a waiver request in the course of the Khobragade 
scandal. DENZA, supra note 19, at 352.  
 227. See supra Part II.B (providing an overview of Abdulaziz and Khobragade).  
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of Protocol already provides for a version of such a list,228 although it is 
neither exhaustive229 nor legally enforceable.230  
The problem with requiring an all-encompassing diplomatic list is 
threefold. First, countries might not want to divulge all of the agents they 
have working in a foreign country.231 For instance, in 2011, the United States 
claimed diplomatic immunity over a covert American agent accused of 
killing two men in Pakistan.232 The United States had not declared the agent’s 
status to Pakistan prior to the incident.233 Classifying the diplomatic list so 
that it is unavailable to the public, as is the case in the United Kingdom,234 
might assuage some countries, but others might be concerned with anyone 
at all—especially the receiving state—obtaining such information. Second, 
a legally determinative diplomatic list would prevent any sort of flexibility 
in cases where governments made genuine errors in either naming someone 
a diplomat or refraining from doing so.235 Third, unless every name on the 
sending state’s list of diplomats is thoroughly vetted, which could prove 
costly, some individuals may still attempt to become diplomats through 
corrupt means in anticipation of committing a wrongful act.  
C. The Judicial Solution 
The solution that best resolves the dilemma of retroactive diplomatic 
immunity involves courts narrowly construing the political question doctrine 
in cases of retroactive diplomatic immunity. As it stands, federal courts 
generally defer to State Department certifications of an individual’s 
diplomatic status, declining to consider whether the individual functions as 
a diplomat or obtained diplomatic status for the purpose of evading the 
 
 228. U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, DIPLOMATIC LIST (2018), https://www.state.gov/documents/
organization/287365.pdf [https://perma.cc/PC42-9GHA] [hereinafter DIPLOMATIC LIST].  
 229. See id. (listing only certain diplomats and their spouses but not diplomats’ dependent children 
who may also be entitled to diplomatic immunity). 
 230. See MCCLANAHAN, supra note 34, at 86 (“[I]n a court of law[, a diplomatic list] may be only 
prima facie evidence, not decisive, and may require supporting testimony from the foreign ministry.” 
(emphasis omitted)).  
 231. See infra notes 232–33 and accompanying text (describing a situation where the United States 
abstained from ex ante providing information on an individual’s diplomatic status). 
 232. Savage, supra note 82.  
 233. See id. (noting conflicting statements about the agent’s legal status in Pakistan and confusion 
over whether he was a consular or diplomatic staff member).  
 234. MCCLANAHAN, supra note 34, at 86.  
 235. Aside from potential constitutional concerns, this is similarly why a statute prohibiting the State 
Department from certifying an individual’s diplomatic status after a civil suit or criminal proceeding has 
been instituted would be troublesome.  
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consequences of past misconduct.236 Where the plaintiff pleads sufficient 
facts that the defendant was not a diplomat when committing the alleged 
conduct, or perhaps not even a diplomat when the proceedings began, as in 
Abdulaziz,237 federal courts should not mechanically grant the defendant’s 
motion to dismiss. This approach would provide at least some means for the 
court to determine whether the individual became a diplomat for nefarious 
or fraudulent purposes, while continuing to provide courts with discretion in 
cases where retroactive diplomatic immunity may be desirable to maintain 
peaceful foreign relations.238 Moreover, a narrow reading of the political 
question doctrine in cases involving retroactive grants of diplomatic 
immunity would harmonize the law of diplomatic immunity with that of 
presidential immunity. Because the Supreme Court has clearly held that not 
even the U.S. president enjoys retroactive immunity,239 there is no 
compelling reason for a diplomat to be afforded as much—especially 
considering that the presidency is an almost unobtainable office, whereas 
there are theoretically thousands of foreign diplomatic positions available for 
exploitation in the United States.240  
Legal scholarship has long criticized the political question doctrine. The 
main arguments against it include that the doctrine enjoys only an attenuated 
textual basis in the Constitution,241 that the executive branch is not always 
the best situated to make certain decisions,242 and that it is contrary to one of 
the “fundamental tenet[s]” of the U.S. government—that “courts have a core 
 
 236. See supra Part II.B (examining two cases in which federal courts allowed retroactive grants of 
diplomatic immunity).  
 237. See supra Part II.B.1 (discussing Abdulaziz).  
 238. See supra notes 144–47 and accompanying text (explaining the fallout from the Khobragade 
scandal).  
 239. See supra notes 198–205 and accompanying text.  
 240. There are likely over six thousand registered foreign diplomats currently living in the United 
States. This number was determined by counting all diplomats and their spouses featured in the State 
Department’s Diplomatic List, which was last updated in Fall 2018. DIPLOMATIC LIST, supra note 228. 
This number does not include spouses who are U.S. nationals, nonspouse family members, or individuals 
entitled to consular immunity. Id. 
 241. See, e.g., Eric A. Posner & Cass R. Sunstein, Chevronizing Foreign Relations Law, 116 YALE 
L.J. 1170, 1202 (2007) (arguing that the textual basis for deference to the executive on foreign relations 
matters is “rather sparse and ambiguous”). 
 242. See, e.g., Rachel E. Barkow, More Supreme Than Court? The Fall of the Political Question 
Doctrine and the Rise of Judicial Supremacy, 102 COLUM. L. REV. 237, 240 (2002) (maintaining that the 
idea “that some constitutional questions ultimately must be decided by the political branches and not 
through judicial review . . . is beginning to seem antiquated”); William S. Dodge, International Comity 
in American Law, 115 COLUM. L. REV. 2071, 2132 (2015) (“A . . . myth of international comity is the 
notion that the executive branch enjoys a comparative advantage in making comity determinations.”).  
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responsibility under the Constitution to resolve disputes.”243 Indeed, some 
scholars contend that the political question doctrine directly conflicts with 
Chief Justice Marshall’s oft-cited axiom from Marbury v. Madison244 that 
“[i]t is emphatically the province and duty of the judicial department to say 
what the law is.”245 And Michael J. Glennon, former Legal Counsel to the 
Senate Foreign Relations Committee during the enactment of the Diplomatic 
Relations Act of 1978,246 argues that the political question doctrine is 
particularly unfit in the arena of foreign affairs:  
The unevenness of congressional oversight, the proclivity of executive 
foreign affairs agencies for violating the law and the traditional 
responsibility of the courts as the last guardians of the Constitution—all 
point to the propriety of an active role for the judiciary in ensuring 
governmental compliance with the law. Specifically, courts should not 
decline to resolve foreign affairs disputes between Congress and the 
President because they present “political questions.”247 
Glennon explains that without the possibility of judicial review of certain 
State Department decisions under the political question doctrine, wrongful 
actions go unchecked,248 something wholly at odds with the very essence of 
the separation-of-powers doctrine.  
Total abandonment of the political question doctrine is unnecessary for 
purposes of resolving the issue of retroactive diplomatic immunity. Federal 
courts need only provide for a narrow reading of a doctrine that has already 
been limited by the Supreme Court.249 As recently as 2012, the Supreme 
 
 243. E.g., Michael J. Glennon, Foreign Affairs and the Political Question Doctrine, 83 AM. J. INT’L 
L. 814, 815 (1989).  
 244. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).  
 245. Id. at 177; Glennon, supra note 243, at 815.  
 246. See Michael J. Glennon, TUFTS: FLETCHER SCH., https://fletcher.tufts.edu/people/michael-j-
glennon [https://perma.cc/T7HY-PWLK] (noting Glennon’s tenure working for the Senate Foreign 
Relations Committee from 1977 through 1980).  
 247. Glennon, supra note 243, at 814.  
 248. Id.  
 249. See Zivotofsky ex rel. Zivotofsky v. Clinton (Zivotofsky I), 566 U.S. 189, 194–95, 211–12 
(2012) (describing the political question doctrine as narrowly applicable); see also Cohen, supra note 
137, at 4 (explaining the Supreme Court’s narrowing of the political question doctrine in Zivotofsky I); 
Alex Loomis, Why Are the Lower Courts (Mostly) Ignoring Zivotofsky I’s Political Question Analysis?, 
LAWFARE (May 19, 2016, 4:23 PM), https://www.lawfareblog.com/why-are-lower-courts-mostly-
ignoring-zivotofsky-political-question-analysis [https://perma.cc/3F7G-ZXC6] (providing an overview 
of the Supreme Court’s view of the political question doctrine and subsequent treatment by lower courts). 
But see Rucho v. Common Cause, 139 S. Ct. 2484, 2507–08 (2019) (finding a gerrymandering case 
nonjusticiable under the political question doctrine). Justice Kagan’s dissent in Rucho aptly describes the 
ills that may come when the political question doctrine is wrongly employed: “In the face of grievous 
harm to democratic governance and flagrant infringements on individuals’ rights . . . the majority declines 
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Court refined the political question doctrine so that its invocation 
necessitates either “a textually demonstrable constitutional commitment” to 
a political branch, or “a lack of judicially . . . manageable standards.”250 
Neither the Constitution nor the text of the Vienna Convention require that 
courts defer to the State Department on matters of retroactive diplomatic 
immunity.251 Furthermore, courts need only use their preexisting fact-finding 
tools to determine whether individuals should be entitled to diplomatic 
immunity. District courts could easily follow the Supreme Court’s lead and 
not leave cases of inherently erroneous diplomatic immunity to the political 
question doctrine. Returning to Monsieur Rich,252 this judicial solution 
would provide an opportunity for a court to determine whether Monsieur 
Rich factually acted as a diplomat, thus warranting immunity, or whether he 
obtained a diplomatic position for the purpose of evading criminal 
prosecution. It might also discourage others like Monsieur Rich from 
attempting such a scheme in the first place.  
CONCLUSION 
Diplomatic immunity is an important pillar of international law. Its 
abuse by nondiplomats is an unfortunate and unintended consequence of 
both the broad language of the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations 
and federal courts’ deference to the State Department on matters of foreign 
relations. It remains to be seen whether more cases of retroactive diplomatic 
immunity will crop up following the successes of the defendants in Abdulaziz 
and Khobragade. Where new cases do arise, however, courts should not feel 
compelled to disregard fraud or malfeasance in the name of promoting the 
executive branch’s view of diplomacy. Diplomacy concerns the friendly, 
open relations between states—not sneaky invocations of immunity.  
 
to provide any remedy.” Id. at 2515 (Kagan, J., dissenting). This is not what federal courts were 
established to do. See supra note 245 and accompanying text. Rather, federal courts should be able to 
resolve issues of individual rights, such as in the mistreatment of Richard in Khobragade. See supra Part 
II.B.2 (discussing Khobragade).  
 250. Zivotofsky I, 566 U.S. at 195 (quotations and citation omitted).  
 251. See generally U.S. CONST.; Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations, supra note 42.  
 252. See supra notes 5–6 and accompanying text.  
